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A COHERENT METHOD FOR WEIGHING THE
DISCRIMINATORY EFFECT OF
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: HUNTINGTON
BRANCH, N.A.A.C.P. V. TOWN OF
HUNTINGTON, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988)
In enacting Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,1 Congress
sought to prohibit discrimination in the sale and rental of housing and
to replace racial ghettos with integrated housing.2 Federal courts have
interpreted Title VIII as proscribing the use of exclusionary zoning' to
prevent the construction of subsidized housing where this zoning has a
discriminatory effect.4 Courts have disagreed, however, on a method
1. Title VIII is commonly known as the "Fair Housing Act." 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-
3631 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
2. The bill's author, Senator Mondale, intended this legislation to replace segregated
neighborhoods with "truly-integrated and balanced living patterns." 114 CoNG. REC.
3422 (1968). Title VIII provides in pertinent part:
it shall be unlawful-
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to
negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwell-
ing to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
In addition, Title VIII declares that "[i]t is the policy of the United States to provide,
within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States." 42
U.S.C. § 3601 (1982).
3. Exclusionary zoning is defined as "[a]ny form of zoning ordinance which tends to
exclude specific classes of persons or businesses from a particular district or area."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 506 (5th ed. 1979). The exclusionary zoning at issue in
this Comment excludes multifamily housing or subsidized housing. See infra notes 38,
45, 59, 68 and accompanying text.
4. See, eg., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village
of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1287-90 (7th Cir. 1977) (Arlington Heights I1),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049,
1052-53 (N.D. Ohio 1980), appeal dismissed without opinion, 633 F.2d 218 (6th Cir.
1980). These courts recognized two forms of discriminatory effect. First, the assailed
act may be discriminatory if it has "a greater adverse impact on one racial group than
on another." Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1290. Second, an act may have a dis-
criminatory effect "if it perpetuates segregation and thereby prevents interracial associa-
tion." Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1290; see generally, Schwartz, The Fair
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for the analysis of an alleged discriminatory effect and on a standard
for balancing the effect against any asserted justifications.'
By incorporating elements of prior decisions,6 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, in Huntington Branch, NA.A. C.P. v. Town of Hunt-
ington,7 has created a comprehensive analytical framework for consid-
ering a zoning policy's discriminatory effect and its justification. The
court held that exclusionary zoning's disproportionate impact8 on mi-
norities can show a discriminatory effect regardless of intent.9 The
Housing Act and "Discriminatory Effect" A New Perspective, I 1 NOVA L. REv. 71, 72
(1986) (citing Arlington Heights II in discussing discriminatory effect).
5. See United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1185-88 (balanced a prima
facie case of discriminatory effect against a compelling governmental interest); Arlington
Heights I1, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977) (considered strength of the discriminatory
effect, intent, defendant's interest, and plaintiff's motivation); Resident Advisory Bd. v.
Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 146-49 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978) (balanced
discriminatory effect against those legitimate governmental interests which cannot be
met through less discriminatory alternatives).
6. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (interpreted a similar provision
in Title VII as prohibiting an act having a greater adverse impact on minorities, regard-
less of intent); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (applied Title VII
analysis to Title VIII cases); Arlington Heights 11, 558 F.2d at 1293 (balanced in favor of
private plaintiffs seeking to enjoin defendant's interference with plaintiffs' construction
of housing project as opposed to those plaintiffs seeking to compel defendant to build
housing); Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 149 (considered those legitimate, bona fide governmental
interests which cannot be met through less discriminatory alternatives.)
7. 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.), affid. per curiam., 109 S. Ct. 276 (1988).
8. "Disproportionate impact" resembles the "greater adverse impact" test for dis-
criminatory effect. See supra note 4 for a discussion of the "greater adverse impact"
test. Disproportionate impact should be distinguished from a comparison of the abso-
lute numbers of two populations. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 77. Where whites consti-
tute a great majority, as in Huntington, a comparison of absolute numbers of persons
that a policy affected would erroneously show the white population suffering a greater
adverse impact because more whites than blacks would be affected. Disproportionate
impact analysis can show that a larger percentage of the black population is affected, in
comparison to the percentage of the white population or their combined population. Id.
According to the 1980 census, 95% of Huntington's 200,000 residents are white and
3.35% are black. Huntington, 844 F.2d at 929. Of the 48 census tracts in Huntington,
six contained 70% of the black residents, concentrated in two neighborhoods. While
7% of all the Town's families needed subsidized housing, 24% of the black families
required such housing. Id.
9. Huntington, 844 F.2d at 934. The Supreme Court left this question to the courts
after holding that intent was an element necessary for a violation of the equal protection
clause. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The Court reversed the First Arling-
ton Heights decision insofar as it was based on an equal protection violation without a
showing of intent; however, the Court remanded for a decision on plaintiff's discrimina-
tory effect claim. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977) (Arlington Heights 1). Though the Supreme Court made no ruling
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court concluded that it must balance the discriminatory effect against
those legitimate governmental interests which cannot be served
through a- less discriminatory alternative. 10
In Huntington, plaintiffs" sought to construct a private, low-income
housing project 12 in a predominantly white neighborhood of single
family homes.1" The Town Board rejected plaintiff's proposal14 to
amend the Town's zoning ordinance, which limited construction of
multifamily housing projects to a largely minority urban renewal
zone. 5 Thereafter, plaintiffs brought suit under Title VIII, 6 alleging
that the Town had caused an unlawful discriminatory effect. Specifi-
cally, plaintiffs alleged that the Town restricted integrated multifamily
on an intent element in Title VIII claims, the Seventh Circuit subsequently considered
intent in deciding Arlington Heights II. Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1292. See
infra notes 48-49, 60-64 and accompanying text (discussing Arlington Heights II intent
inquiry).
10. Huntington, 844 F.2d at 939. See infra notes 51-56, 72-76 and accompanying
text (discussing legitimate governmental interests).
11. The named plaintiffs were the Huntington Branch of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People, Housing Help, Inc., Mabel Harris, Perrepper
Crutchfield, and Kenneth Cofield. 844 F.2d at 926. Plaintiffs represented a class of
[a]ll black, Hispanic and lower income persons in need of lower cost housing op-
portunities in Huntington and surrounding areas and who would qualify for resi-
dency in the proposed Matinecock Court and other Section 8 projects in
Huntington, and who seek to reside in and insure opportunity for racially and eco-
nomically integrated housing in Huntington. "Section 8" refers to a federal pro-
gram that provides subsidies for newly-constructed and substantially-rehabilitated
housing.
844 F.2d at 928 n.2.
12. Id. at 930. Housing Help, Inc. [hereinafter H.H.I.] obtained an option to
purchase a 14.8 acre parcel for construction of a 162-unit housing project. Id. at 930-
31. H.H.I. joined National Housing Partnership, which owns and manages federally
subsidized housing, in filing a joint application with the Department of Housing and
Urban Development [hereinafter H.U.D.] for Section 8 funding for the project. Id. at
931.
13. Id. at 930. The population within a one-mile radius of the proposed project site
was 98% white. Id. at 931.
14. Id. at 932. Robert Ralph, director of H.H.I., filed a request asking the Town
Board to amend the zoning ordinance and allow construction of multifamily rental
housing on its project site, originally zoned for single family homes on one acre lots. Id.
at 931. Facing public pressure, the Town Board adopted a resolution requesting that
H.U.D. reject H.H.I.'s application for Section 8 funding. Id at 931-32.
15. Id. at 930, citing Huntington Town Code, § 198-20(A). The relevant sections of
the Town Code provide:
Use regulations. In the R-3M Apartment District, a building or premises shall
be used only for the following purposes:
(2) Multi-family dwellings which constitute an approved public housing project
Washington University Open Scholarship
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housing to its urban renewal area and refused to rezone the site outside
this area.17 The District Court for the Eastern District of New York
found that the plaintiffs failed to make a prima facie showing that the
Town's actions had a discriminatory effect. 8 Additionally, it found
that the Town had articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons
for its actions. 9 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, hold-
ing that plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of discriminatory
effect on the Town's minority population.2" The court further ruled
that the Town had offered insufficient proof that it acted to promote a
legitimate governmental interest and that no less discriminatory alter-
native existed.21
Title VIII proscribes the refusal to sell or rent a dwelling to any
person "because of race."22 In applying this language to claims based
on the discriminatory effect of exclusionary zoning, courts have dis-
to be owned, maintainied and operated by the Housing Authority of the Town of
Huntington.
(3) Multi-family dwellings where such dwellings constitute an element in a for-
mally approved land use or a use plan for all or part of an urban renewal area
which has been designated as such under the provisions of Article 15 of the Gen-
eral Municipal Law.
Huntington, 844 F.2d at 929. Thus, private construction multi-family housing was lim-
ited to the urban renewal area where 52% of the population were minority groups. Id.
at 930.
16. Id. at 928.
17. Id. at 928. The District Court for the Eastern District of New York initially
held that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. Huntington Branch N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of
Huntington, 530 F.Supp. 838, 843-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 391 (2d Cir.
1982) (Huntington 1), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983). The district judge held that
plaintiffs lacked standing because of their inability to obtain Section 8 funds. Id. at 843-
45. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. Huntington I, 689 F.2d at
394. The Second Circuit also held that plaintiffs were not required to file a formal
application for rezoning because the Town Board's resolution opposing the project
made the pursuit of other remedies moot. Id. at 393 n.3.
18. Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, 668 F. Supp. 762, 787
(E.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.), affid. per curiam, 109 S.Ct. 276 (1988).
This was actually the court's second holding of failure to establish a prima facie case.
Previously, the court found that plaintiffs failed to apply for rezoning. Id. at 785.
19. Id. at 786-87.
20. Huntington, 844 F.2d at 937-38. See infra notes 57-69 and accompanying text
(discussing the Second Circuit decision).
21. 844 F.2d at 939-41. See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (discussing
the Town's justifications).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1982 and Supp. III 1985). See supra notes 1, 2 (discussing the
Fair Housing Act).
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agreed as to whether Title VIII contemplates some consideration of the
defendant's intent 23 and the nature and level of effect necessary to es-
tablish a violation.24 Because Title VIII is similar to Title VII, in its
language and purpose,25 many courts have applied analytical methods
derived from Title VII employment discrimination cases to housing
discrimination claims.21 Courts justify prima facie discriminatory ef-
fects that may violate Title VII through a showing of quantifiable
23. See e.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975)(holding that an act which actually or predict-
ably results in discrimination violates Title VIII); United States v. Starrett City Assoc.,
840 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 376 (1988) (following Title VII
precedent in ruling against an intent requirement); Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc.,
610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979) (plaintiff need not show discriminatory intent in denial of
purchase of cooperative apartment). But see Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Vil-
lage of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1292 (including intent in its evaluation of
discriminatory effect). See infra notes 33-34, 48, and 62-64 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing intent considerations). See generally Schwartz, Making and Meeting the Prima
Facie Case Under the Fair Housing Act, 20 AKRON L. Rnv. 291-314 (1986) (discussing
plaintiff's prima facie case in individual housing discrimination, including a discussion
of racial motive); Kmiec, Exclusionary Zoning and Purposeful Racial Segregation in
Housing: Two Wrongs Deserving Separate Remedies, 18 URB. LAW. 393, 396-99 (inap-
plicability of intent to zoning).
24. In disparate or disproportional impact cases, courts typically view impact data
in terms of absolute numbers of persons affected or their proportion to their popula-
tions. See infra notes 45-49, 65-68 and accompanying text.
25. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et. seq., is similar to Title VIII in that it prohibits
discrimination, in employment practices, "because of [an] individual's race." 42 U.S.C.
§ 20004-2(a). The courts have broadly construed both titles in order to effectuate these
statutes' goals of integration in employment and housing, respectively. See e.g., Traf-
ficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1972) (Fair Housing Act
must be interpreted generously to encourage integration); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 429-36 (1971) (Title VII must be interpreted broadly to achieve its goal of
equal employment opportunity). See Comment, Applying the Title VII Prima Facie
Case to Title VI111 Litigation, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 128, 158-60 (1976) (noting
similarities, in language and approach, between Title VII and Title VIII). But see Boyd
v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 517 F.2d 918, cert. denied, 423
U.S. 896 (1975) (doubting the applicability of Title VII methodology to Title VIII
situations).
26. Title VII's disparate impact analysis is the primary contribution to Title VIII
litigation. See notes 62-69 infra. The prima facie case method has only limited applica-
bility, however, because Title VIII defenses are general welfare considerations rather
than the quantifiable business justifications found in Title VII defenses. Comment,
supra note 25, at 160-61. Attempts to employ Title VII defense analysis to Title VIII
cases have tended to make plaintiff's burden of proof onerous. See, e.g., Huntington
Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 933 (2d Cir.), affid., 109 S.
Ct. 276 (1988) (criticizing requirement that plaintiff prove defendant's justifications
were "pretextual," a test from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973); Comment, Justifying a Discriminatory Effect Under the Fair Housing Act: A
Washington University Open Scholarship
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"business necessity."27 The nebulous justifications that are offered for
exclusionary zoning practices resist such quantification, however, and
attempts to apply Title VII analysis to these justifications are of dubi-
ous validity.28 This gap in the applicability of Title VII analysis to
Title VIII cases has required the courts to formulate various ap-
proaches in analyzing a discriminatory effect and weighing its
significance.29
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 3 the Supreme Court held that an em-
ployment practice with a discriminatory effect can violate Title VII,
regardless of the employer's intent.31 The Court found that under Title
VII, facially neutral tests that reject a disparate number of minority
applicants in comparison to white applicants are, in effect, discrimina-
tory.3 2 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that an employer may de-
fend an employment practice with a discriminatory effect through a
showing of "business necessity." The Court suggested that a compel-
ling correlation between the practice in question and a legitimate busi-
ness purpose would be one such justification.33 Although the Court
Search for the Proper Standard, 27 UCLA L. REv. 398, 406 (1979) (noting that proving
discriminatory intent is not necessary to establish Title VIII violation).
27. In Griggs, the Supreme Court held that an employment requirement having dis-
criminatory effect "must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question."
401 U.S. at 432. See supra notes 27 and infra notes 31, 33, 72-78 and accompanying
text (discussing defendant's justifications).
28. In Huntington, the district court required plaintiffs to prove that defendant's
justifications were "pretextual," following a test derived from Title VII disparate treat-
ment cases. 844 F.2d at 933. The appellate court rejected this application of disparate
"treatment" analysis to a disparate "impact" claim. The court reasoned that the former
involves differential treatment of similarly situated groups while the latter examines the
differential impact of a facially neutral policy on a particular group. Huntington, 844
F.2d at 933-34.
29. Courts have adopted approaches which are either "absolute," defining a thresh-
old at which rights are violated or justification is sufficient, or "balanced," which weighs
the legitimate competing interests. Comment, supra note 26, at 419.
30. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
3 1. Id at 429-32. The Court found discriminatory effect in an employment require-
ment disqualifying blacks at a "substantially higher rate" than whites. Id. at 426. Sig-
nificantly, plaintiffs established that the defendants requirement, a high school diploma,
would have a predictably greater effect on black applicants because only 12% of black
males, as opposed to 34% of white males, could meet this requirement. Id. at 430 n.6.
This focus on effect, in terms of both actual and predictable effects of facially neutral
policies, necessarily excluded reference to intent, which required a far more subjective
analysis. Comment, supra note 25, at 152-160.
32. 401 U.S. at 429-30.
33. Id. at 431. The Court held that the practice in question must have a "manifest
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implicitly recognized the need to balance a discriminatory effect
against competing interests, it failed to enunciate guidelines for lower
courts to follow in weighing these factors.3 4
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Griggs rationale to
a Title VIII claim 5 in United States v. City of Black Jack.3 6 The court
found that a zoning ordinance prohibiting multifamily, low-income
housing37 would prevent the great majority of blacks in the neighbor-
ing metropolitan area from obtaining housing in Black Jack. 8 This
relationship" to a legitimate business purpose. Id. at 432. The Court found that neither
the high school diploma requirement nor a standardized intelligence test disqualifying a
greater percentage of blacks had any relation to job performance. Id. at 431. See also
Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 245 (5th Cir. 1974) (business
purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact and no alternative
policy must accomplish the purpose as well with less differential racial impact); United
States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972) (en
banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973) (practice with discriminatory impact must
"not only foster safety and efficiency, but must be essential to that goal"). Examining
quantifiable results to prove a requirement's validity is not readily applicable to zoning
defenses, which are based on nebulous "quality of life" arguments. See Comment, supra
note 25, at 170-71.
34. The Court merely concluded that the employment practice automatically dis-
qualified a "disproportionate number" of blacks but failed to define the meaning of
"disproportion" for later application. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429.
35. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975). The Eighth Circuit expanded a previous application
of the broad interpretation of Title VII goals to Title VIII and Grigg's use of a prima
facie case approach. See Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826 (8th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1975) (the "prima facie case" applies to discrimination in
housing like other forms of discrimination).
36. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
37. The site for the housing project in question was in an unincorporated area until
the proposed project became public and local residents initiated a petition drive leading
to its incorporation within the City of Black Jack. Id. at 1182. Following incorpora-
tion, the City Zoning Commission prohibited the construction of any new multiple-
family dwellings and made the present ones nonconforming uses. Id. at 1183. Other
courts have cited such abrupt policy changes as evidence of discriminatory intent. See,
e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265 (1977) (to find discriminatory intent, a court must consider the history and "se-
quence of events leading up to the challenged decisions," any departures from "normal
procedural sequences," and departures from normal substantive criteria); Kennedy
Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1010 (1971) (sudden moratorium on new subdivisions and rezoning of plain-
tiff's site despite the City Planner's recommendations interpreted as intentional
discrimination).
38. 508 F.2d at 1182-83. The court contrasted the virtually all-white character of
Black Jack with nearby St. Louis, which was 65.6% black. Id. at 1183. See also,
United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1052, 1063-64 (N.D. Ohio), appeal dis-
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exclusionary effect tended to preserve the area's segregated housing
pattern.3 9 Finding sufficient proof that the defendant's ordinance had
actually or predictably resulted in racial discrimination, the court rec-
ognized a prima facie case of discriminatory effect." ° Once plaintiff
establishes discriminatory effect, the court held, the defendant must
then demonstrate that the challenged ordinance furthers a "compelling
governmental interest."41 The court based the "compelling govern-
mental interest" test on constitutional equal protection analysis.4" As
such, this rigorous test subjects defendant's justifications to a height-
ened scrutiny which few can survive.43
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Black Jack ap-
proach in Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village ofArling-
ton Heights.' In considering the discriminatory effect of the Village's
refusal to rezone the plaintiff's site for low-income housing, the Arling-
ton Heights court assessed its impact on area minorities45 and its ten-
missed without opinion, 633 F.2d 218, (6th Cir. 1980) (interpreting the disparity between
the actual and predicted percentage of black population in the Cleveland metropolitan
area as evidence of racial housing segregation); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ.,
837 F.2d 1181, 1185-88 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2821 (1988) (finding a
pattern of racial segregation in successive census reports in terms of increasing minority
concentration by area). But see In re Malone, 592 F. Supp. 1135, 1167 (E.D. Mo. 1984),
affid without opinion sub nom., Malone v. Fenton, 794 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1986) (inter-
preting statistics showing that 25% of St. Louis City's black families could buy 45% of
the homes in the largely white suburb of Fenton as proof of associational preference
rather than segregation).
39. The court held that the ordinance effectively foreclosed 85% of the blacks living
in the surrounding area from obtaining housing in Black Jack. 508 F.2d at 1186.
40. Id. at 1186.
41. Id. at 1185. The court defined a compelling interest in a three part test: first,
whether the ordinance in fact furthers the governmental interest asserted; second,
whether the public interest the ordinance serves is constitutionally permissible and sub-
stantially outweighs private detriment; third, whether less drastic means are available to
attain the stated governmental interest. Id. at 1186-87.
42. Id. at 1185 n.4.
43. The "compelling governmental interest" test has been described as equivalent to
those tests used in equal protection analysis when a fundamental right or a suspect
classification is implicated. Therefore the test is difficult to meet. See Schwartz, supra
note 4, at 75. See also Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine On a Chang-
ing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)
(describing the test as "strict in theory and fatal in fact").
44. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977) (Arlington Heights II), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025
(1978). See supra note 9 (discussing Arlington Heights I1).
45. 558 F.2d at 1291. Though the court recognized that the refusal had a disparate
impact on the area's minority population, its findings concluded that, because 60% of
the effected population was white, racially discriminatory effect did not exist. Id. Had
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dency to preserve segregated housing patterns.4 6 The court held that
under Title VIII a discriminatory effect determination is a matter for
the court's discretion.47 In exercising this discretion, the court consid-
ered the strength of the effect, any evidence of intent, the defendant's
interest in the action and whether plaintiff sought to enjoin the defend-
ant's interference or compel the defendant to provide housing.4 8 Be-
cause these factors are encountered in any Title VIII claim, the
Arlington Heights test gained widespread acceptance.4 9
In Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo,5" the Third Circuit Court of
the court used disparate impact analysis it would have compared the percentage of the
black and white populations affected, rather than their absolute numbers. Schwartz,
supra note 4, at 81. See supra notes 8, 31-32, and infra notes 65-66 and accompanying
text (discussing the absolute number comparison).
46. 558 F.2d at 1290. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205,
209-10 (recognizing discriminatory effect both in terms of impact on a racial group and
segregatory effect). See also, Farrell, Integrating by Discriminating: Affirmative Action
that Disadvantages Minorities, 62 U. DET. L. REV. 553 (1985) (H.U.D. refusal to build
public housing in minority areas because of "discriminatory effect").
47. 558 F.2d at 1290. See also, Park View Heights v. City of Black Jack, 605 F.2d
1033, 1039-40 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 905 (1980) (district court should
decide equitable relief issues and should seek to eliminate the discriminatory effect as far
as possible).
48. 558 F.2d at 1290. The inclusion of an intent factor has been thoroughly at-
tacked as irrelevant to impact and effect considerations. See Mandelker, Racial Dis-
crimination and Exclusionary Zoning, 55 TEx. L. REV. 1217, 1244 (1977) (intent
considerations are against the spirit of the fourteenth amendment and out of touch with
the realities of exclusionary zoning). But see Comment, A Last Stand on Arlington
Heights: Title VIII and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV.
150 (1978) (criticizing the Arlington Heights standard for finding Title VIII violations
absent discriminatory intent). The distinction between claims against interference with
a private housing project and those which seek to force the municipality to build hous-
ing has gained widespread acceptance. See generally Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682
F.2d 1055, 1069-70 (4th Cir. 1982) (prohibiting a court from requiring local govern-
ment to fund a housing project); Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Hunting-
ton, 844 F.2d 926, 940 (2d Cir.), affid, 109 S. Ct. 276 (1988) (noting that a defendant
faces a greater burden of proof when seeking to prevent construction of a private hous-
ing project).
49. See, e.g., Keith v. Volpe, 618 F. Supp. 1132 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (compared abso-
lute numbers of persons affected and utilized Arlington's factors as a threshold test for a
prima facie case of discriminatory effect); United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp.
1052, 1098 (N.D. Ohio), appeal dismissed without opinion, 633 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1980)
(utilized Arlington's factors to test whether a discriminatory effect was sufficient to con-
stitute a prima facie case); Atkins v. Robinson, 545 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Va. 1982), affid,
733 F.2d 318 (4th Cir. 1984) (employed Arlington approach exclusively).
50. 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
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Appeals distinguished the Arlington Heights factors.' Choosing to
reformulate the Black Jack prima facie case method, the Third Circuit
replaced the "compelling governmental interest" requirement with a
less stringent standard analogous to the Title VII "business necessity"
test.2 Noting the problems inherent in comparing Title VII defenses
with Title VIII justifications, the court concluded that there must be a
case-by-case analysis of a defendant's justifications, guided by two gen-
eral considerations. 3 First, the discriminatory act must serve a legiti-
mate governmental interest of the defendant, both in theory and
practice.54 Second, the defendant must show that no alternative could
serve that interest with less discriminatory effect.55 Because the de-
fendants in Rizzo offered no valid justification for their acts, the viabil-
ity of these considerations awaited testing in later cases.16
In Huntington Branch, N.A.A. CP. v. Town of Huntington57 the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals employed disparate impact analysis"8 in
51. Id. at 148 n.32. The court interpreted the Arlington factors as "a standard upon
which ultimate Title VIII relief may be predicated, rather than indicating the point at
which the evidentiary burden of justifying a discriminatory effect will shift to the de-
fendant." Id.
52. Id. at 148. The Rizzo court found the "compelling governmental interest" bur-
den too onerous for a Title VIII defendant. Id But see Comment, supra note 26, at 416
(Black Jack and Rizzo tests considered substantially similar).
53. 564 F.2d at 149. In doing so, the court referred to Arlington Heights II, but
with the caveat that it considered Arlington's four factors unsuitable for a determination
of the merits. Instead, it found they were merely a standard for Title VIII relief. Id. at
148 n.32.
54. Id. at 149. This consideration is substantially similar to the first of Black Jack's
three part test for compelling governmental interest. See supra notes 41-43 and accom-
panying text (discussing the Black Jack approach).
55. 564 F.2d at 149. This consideration is substantially similar to the third part of
Black Jack's test for compelling governmental interest. See supra notes 41-43 and ac-
companying text. Thus, Rizzo rejects the balancing considerations of the Black Jack
test as well as its onus as a constitutional test. See Comment, supra note 26, at 416.
56. See Burney v. Housing Authority of the County of Beaver, 551 F. Supp. 746,
768-70 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (defendant's concern that plaintiff's housing project would
cause white flight by tipping the racial balance); United States v. City of Parma, 494 F.
Supp. 1052, 1055 (N.D. Ohio), appeal dismissed without opinion, 633 F.2d 218 (6th Cir.
1980) (adopting the Rizzo test for analysis of defendant's justifications); United States v.
Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 2821 (1988)
(acknowledging similar considerations); Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of
Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 939 (2d Cir.), ajf'dper curiam, 109 S. Ct. 276 (1988) (adopt-
ing an augmented Rizzo test for analysis of defendant's justifications).
57. 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 109 S. Ct. 276 (1988).
58. See supra note 8 (discussing disparate impact analysis).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol37/iss1/9
1990] HUNTINGTON BRANCH, N.A.A.C.P. v. TOWN OF HUNTINGTON 267
finding that plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of discrimina-
tory effect in the Town's exclusionary zoning practices. 9 Criticizing
the lower court's use of the Arlington Heights approach,' ° the Hunting-
ton court chose to examine the defendant's justifications in light of the
general considerations of Rizzo.
6 1
The Second Circuit assailed the district court's emphasis on the
Town's lack of discriminatory intent in denying plaintiff's request to
rezone a property for low-income housing.62 Rejecting any reference
to intent in its analysis of the discriminatory effect claim, the court
cited practical concerns 63 about the tendency of an intent inquiry to
subvert the analysis of an act's impact.64 The court also criticized the
lower court's analysis of absolute numbers of persons affected by the
zoning ordinance, 65 holding that the Town's refusal to rezone must be
analyzed in terms of its proportional impact on minorities relative to its
impact on the white population.66
The Huntington court also criticized the lower court's failure to con-
59. Huntington, 844 F.2d at 941.
60. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (discussing the Arlington Heights
approach).
61. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (discussing the Rizzo
considerations).
62. Huntington, 844 F.2d at 933-34. Actually, this was the court's second holding
after summarily dismissing the lower court's contention that plaintiffs lacked standing.
Id. at 932. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
63. 844 F.2d at 935. The Second Circuit quoted Black Jack, which noted that
"clever men may easily conceal their motivations." Id. at 935 (quoting United States v.
City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042
(1975)). The court also emphasized the applicability of Title VII analysis to Title VIII
situations. 844 F.2d at 935.
64. Id. The Second Circuit noted the lower court's concentration on "pretextual"
justifications for the defendant's actions and its finding that plaintiff's failure to prove
segregative intent was a factor in the Town's favor. Id.
65. Id. at 933. Though the Town of Huntington is more than 95% white, the lower
court compared the poor population of whites (22,160) to that of minorities (3,671) in
finding that minorities were not disproportionately affected. Id. The lower court also
failed to consider the racial make-up of the waiting lists for subsidized housing, which
was 45% minority. Id. at 929.
66. Id. at 938. See supra note 8 (criticizing an analysis based on absolute numbers).
The court concluded that Griggs required this disparate impact analysis. Id. at 938.
The court blamed Arlington Heights 11 for the confusion over the content of the prima
facie case of disparate impact. Id. at 935. The lower court used Arlington's four factors
as a test for the existence of a prima facie case, rather than as a standard for determining
the appropriate relief, as Rizzo interpreted them. Id. See supra notes 32-34, 48, 49, 53
and accompanying text (discussing Arlington Heights II factors and Rizzo).
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sider the role of the Town's zoning policy in perpetuating the Town's
largely segregated housing patterns.67 The court found that by restrict-
ing the construction of low-income housing to a predominantly minor-
ity urban renewal area, the Town's zoning ordinance impeded
integration.68 Thus, the court found that the Town's refusal to rezone
established a prima facie case of discriminatory effect, both in its im-
pact on minorities and its segregatory effect.69
In analyzing the Town's justifications, the court augmented the gen-
eral considerations of Rizzo with a specific method for assessing the
Town's concerns.7' The court delineated two types of problems
claimed by the Town in its refusal to rezone the project site. First, it
characterized "plan specific" problems that could be resolved through
reasonable design modifications. 7 Second, "site specific" problems
could be analyzed under Rizzo's "legitimate and bona fide" standard.72
While the court stated that "plan specific" disputes could be resolved
at the time plaintiffs applied for rezoning, it offered no criteria for a
reviewing court to use in weighing unresolved disputes.73 In finding
the Town's "site specific" objections insubstantial,74 the court dis-
missed the Town's claim that limiting multifamily housing to the urban
67. 844 F.2d at 937-38. The lower court concentrated on segregative intent, rather
than existing segregated housing patterns. Id. at 933.
68. Id. at 937. Restricting low-income housing to largely minority neighborhoods
may also have a discriminatory effect in the denial of funds for such housing. Farrell,
supra note 46, at 565-69.
69. 844 F.2d at 938. See supra note 46, discussing Trafficante's two forms of dis-
criminatory effect.
70. 844 F.2d at 939. The court noted the difficulty in applying Title VII analysis to
Title VIII cases, owing to the variety of reasons supporting zoning, none of which allow
for Griggs analysis. Id. at 936. Beyond recognizing that a town's interest in zoning is
significant, the court sought to balance those interests against those discriminatory ef-
fects which it held significant. Id. at 937.
71. Id at 939. However, the court offered no guidance in interpreting what would
constitute a "reasonable" design modification and who would make such modifications.
See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (discussing application in future Title VIII
disputes).
72. 844 F.2d at 939. The court held that a substantial site specific objection is one
that would "justify a reasonable official in making this determination." Id.
73. Id. The court dismissed as "plan specific," problems with fire protection, prox-
imity to a railroad and an electric power substation (which could be cured through
landscaping), inadequate recreation and parking areas, and undersized units. Id. at 940.
See also, Keith v. Volpe, 618 F. Supp. 1132, 1154-55 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (considering
problems of population density and diminished contribution to the tax base).
74. 844 F.2d at 940.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol37/iss1/9
1990] HUNTINGTON BRANCH, N.A.A.C.P. v. TOWN OF HUNTINGTON 269
renewal area furthered the design of the zoning ordinance by encourag-
ing development in that area."5 Instead, the court suggested that the
less discriminatory alternative of tax incentives could satisfy this
objective.7 6
In balancing the discriminatory effect of the zoning policy against
the Town's remaining justification that it was acting within the scope
of its authority,7 7 the court incorporated Arlington Heights' considera-
tion of the remedy sought.7 8 Thus, the court struck the balance in
favor of plaintiffs seeking to enjoin defendant's interference and its dis-
criminatory effect.7 9
The Huntington court correctly noted that where the central concern
of a discriminatory effect claim is a policy's impact on a minority popu-
lation, an inquiry into the policy's intent is specious and irrelevant to
the analysis of that claim.80 The only logical method for analyzing a
policy's disproportionate impact upon a group is to examine the per-
centage of persons affected in a minority group relative to the percent-
age of persons affected in the majority.8 1 On this point, the Huntington
court clarified a longstanding source of confusion in Title VIII
75. Id. The court dismissed other specific objections to the site, such as traffic,
health and sewer considerations because they were unsupported at trial. Id See also,
Keith, 618 F. Supp. at 1153-55 (dismissing as pretextual: objections to a housing site
based on an expected increase in traffic; burden to schools; and a city policy of dispers-
ing low income tenants by restricting them to 35% of a housing development).
76. 844 F.2d at 939. See infra note 85 (discussing this alternative).
77. This approach, in effect, incorporates a Black Jack balancing component into
the Rizzo approach, which drew heavily from Black Jack. See supra notes 52-55 and
accompanying text (discussing this incorporation).
78. 844 F.2d at 940. The court endorsed the Seventh Circuit's idea that "the bal-
ance should be more readily struck in favor of the plaintiff when it is seeking only to
enjoin a municipal defendant from interfering with its own plans rather than attempting
to compel the defendant itself to build housing." Id
79. Id. at 941.
80. Id. at 935. Requiring proof of intent would make Title VIII irrelevant to all but
the most blatant acts of intentional segregation. See United States v. City of Black Jack,
508 F.2d 1179, 1185 n.3 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978). Thus, an
intent requirement would make Title VIII powerless to combat de facto segregation, as
was its original intent. Comment, supra note 26, at 406.
8 1. Analysis of absolute numbers of persons affected will generally find a disparate
impact only where racial minorities constitute a significant part of the population or
where an act engenders an impact so disproportionate that the numerical minority is
not reflected in the number of persons affected. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 77.
When an inquiry should reflect the extent of a discriminatory effect, it is senseless to
treat a minority as though equal in number to the majority.
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litigation.82
The Huntington court's most significant contribution to the resolu-
tion of Title VIII disputes is its concrete approach to the countervailing
community interests in zoning controls and integrated housing.8"
Though the court granted the Huntington plaintiffs their preferred
site,84 the court's approach allows for creative resolution of competing
interests through its acknowledgment of "plan" and "site" specific ob-
jections." Under the Huntington approach, parties to Title VIII litiga-
tion can address specific objections through compromise. This
compromise permits communities to resolve housing segregation
problems that zoning controls would otherwise perpetuate.8 6 Because
resolution of plan and site problems may require protracted and highly
technical negotiations, this aspect of Title VIII litigation should be en-
trusted to arbitration under the aegis of the Department of Housing
and Urban Development. 7
Huntington Branch, N.A.A. CF. v. Town of Huntington provides dis-
82. See Comment, supra note 26, at 406-407 (arguing against an intent standard);
Mandelker, supra note 48, at 1217-53 (discussing Arlington Heights racial motive or
intent doctrine).
83. While recognizing the legitimacy of many zoning objectives, the court held that
they cannot "automatically outweigh significant disparate effects." 844 F.2d at 937.
Thus, by inquiring into the legitimacy of zoning objectives, the court allowed for a
judgment more carefully crafted to the needs of the community. See generally
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 95.
84. The court justified site specific relief in noting that this litigation spanned seven
years, jeopardizing plaintiffs' development plans. Additionally, the Town failed to use
H.U.D. community development grants to assist the development of low-income hous-
ing. Huntington, 844 F.2d at 941-42.
85. By dismissing all "plan specific" objections, the court shunts these problems off
to another forum. Id. at 939-40. Although that forum or those considerations may be
litigated at a later time, they can also be resolved through arbitration. The court's anal-
ysis indicates a receptivity to holding any objection as "plan specific" or otherwise capa-
ble of resolution through alternatives, such as a tax incentive for the urban renewal area.
Id. at 939.
86. It deserves noting that zoning controls are usually based on existing, often seg-
regated, housing patterns which act to preserve the status quo. See Mandelker, supra
note 48, at 1217. Where H.U.D. denies Section 8 funding to projects proposed for
racially impacted neighborhoods, exclusionary zoning controls can act to exacerbate
existing housing shortages, preventing their solution. See Resident Advisory Bd. v.
Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 133 n.7 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
87. After the Huntington decision, Congress enacted the Fair Housing Amend-
ments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, §§ 800-15, 102 Stat. 1619-36 (1988)(codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631). Under Section 810 of the Act, a complaint can be filed with
H.U.D., requiring it to conduct an investigation, conciliation hearings, and enforce con-
ciliation agreements. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3610(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1989).
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parate impact analysis a clear and concise argument in its favor. When
a housing problem creates legitimate controversy, rather than bigoted
reaction, the Huntington approach provides courts with a framework
for an equitable solution.
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